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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

L. JACK GRAHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

••
••
••
••

Supreme Court No. 18363

••
••
••

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, R. THORNE FOUNDATION :
••
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendant-Appellee,

••
••

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal f rorn an order of the Industrial
Commission confirming the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law of the Administrative Law Judge.
PISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the plaintiff,
L. Jack Graham, was an independent contractor and therefore not
entitled to receive worker's compensation benefits from R. Thorne
Foundation and its insurance carrier, The State Insurance Fund.
The Administrative Law Judge, Keith E. Sohm, entered his Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on January 21, 1982.

The

Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order and denied of the plaintiff's Motion
for Review on March 9, 1982.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellee is asking this court to affirm the
Order of the Industrial Cornmissione
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about November 8, 1980, plaintiff Graham ("plaintiff")
contacted R. Thorne, owner of defendant corporation (hereinafter
jointly and severally "defendant") offering to shingle roofs
on homes defendant was constructing. (R. 13)

Plaintiff and defendant

entered into an informal telephone agreement whereby plaintiff
agreed to shingle houses for a fee between $6.50 and $8.00 per
square.

(R.

14)

Plaintiff has been involved in the roofing business,
in some capacity, for 41 years (R. 11).

During that period of

time, he has developed certain techniques in roofing.

For instance,

plaintiff uses strip flashing on a roof as opposed to normal
continuous flashing procedures. (R. 18)

Plaintiff used these

techniques on defendant's homes even though these techniques
were not normally followed on the homes constructed by defendant.
(R.

18)
During November and December of 1980 and January and

February of 1981, plaintiff periodically shingled houses for
defendant.

(R.

12, 54)

Plaintiff billed defendant on a monthly

basis for homes on which he had completed the roofing.

(R. 20)

Throughout plaintiff's contractual relationship with defendant,
plaintiff "was given some latitude in decision making."

(R. 37)

Plaintiff used all his own tools (R. 63) and worked on his own
time schedule.

(R. 61)

Defendant never instructed plaintiff

as to when or how to do the work.

(R. 74)

knows very little about roofing. (R.73)

Defendant himself

On only one occasion,

2
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plaintiff did accornodate defendant by beginning work on a roof
before the roofing on another house had been completed.

(R. 28)

Defendant did not deduct social security or withholding taxes
from plaintiff's checks.

(R. 36)

he was not covered by insurance.

Defendant informed plaintiff

(R. 56, 77)

On occasion, plaintiff

hired others to help him do the shingling on the defendant's
homes.

(R. 25,26,57) During this period, plaintiff worked for

three other contractors.

(R. 52)

During January, 1980, plaintiff

worked only three days on homes being constructed by defendant
and worked the rest of the month for other contractors. (R. 55)
Plaintiff was injured in two separate accidents while
working on defendant's homes.

On November 25, 1980, defendant

slipped while carrying a bundle of shingles up the ladder. (R. 99)
His son took him to .the Valley West Emergency Room where it was
determined that plaintiff had sustained minor wrist and shoulder
injuries.

(R.

99)

On February 6, 1981, plaintiff slipped on

some ice causing him to fall off the building on which he was
working.

Plaintiff incurred various injuries in this fall, including

a fractured wrist, pelvis and hip. (R. 99)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE FINDING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE,
UPHELD BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, THAT THE
PLAINTIFF WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND,
THEREFORE, NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER WORKER'S
COMPENSATION WAS WITHIN THE COMMISSION'S
DISCRETION AND SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED BY THIS
COURT.
It is well settled law that this Court should reverse
3
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the Industrial Commission's findings only if they are arbitrary
and capricious or completely without support in the record.
In Jones v. Ogden Auto Body, 646 P.2d 703 (Utah 1982), this court
reasserted the standard of review set forth in Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Manfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah i981), and affirmed the Commission's
order:
• • • This court's function in reviewing the
Commission's findings is a strictly limited one in
which the question is not whether the court agrees
with the Commission's findings or whether they are
supported by the preponderance of the evidence.
Instead, the reviewing court inquiry is whether the
Commission's findings are narbitrary or capriciousn
or "wholly without cause" or contrary to the "one
(inevitable) conclusion from the evidence" or without
any substantial evidence to support them. Only then
should the Commission's findings be displaced.

ll. at 890.
The Comission's findings in the instant case do not
fall under any of the exceptions and, therefore, should not be
reversed.

The findings, based on a complete evidentiary hearing

before the Administrative Law Judge are not arbitrary and capricious.
Nor were the findings "wholly without cause" or contrary to the
"one inevitable conclusion from the evidence" or without "any
substantial evidence to support them."

The record is replete

with decision making procedures, and other matters which provide
a wholly rational basis for the findings of the Administrative
Law Judge affirmed by the Commission.

In his Findings of Fact

the Administrative Law Judge pointed to some of the evidence
upon which he based his conclusion:
Doing piece work as a carpenter, the applicant
usually was paid by the hour with no deductions,
4
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but when doing roof work he was paid by the square
with no deductions being taken out for taxes or
social security. The applicant worked on his own
schedule, sometimes working on one house and sometimes working on another house and sometimes working
on other jobs and then returning to the Thorne
Construction job. If the applicant could not do
some of the work he would hire someone to do it.
He had his son and other helpers on the job, he
supervised their work though they usually had
their own tools. At the same time he was working
on the Thorne Construction job he was also working
on other jobs for other contractors at the same
time, going to and from the jobs at his own
discretion. The other companies did not withhold
social security or income taxes either. Thorne
Construction allowed the applicant to order supplies
on occassion because his computation was more accurate
because he knew exactly how much more work was to be
done. Mr. Thorne had informed the applicant that he
was not covered by workmen's compensation benefits.
(R.

99)

The record demonstrates that the findings approved
by the Commission were not arbitrary, capricious or without support
and, therefore, this court should affirm the Comission's order.
POINT II

EVEN IF THE WORK DONE BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS WORK
PERFORMED IN THE USUAL COURSE OF DEFENDANT'S
BUSINESS, THAT FACT ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
QUALIFY PLAINTIFF AS AN EMPLOYEE UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN. SECTION 35-1-42 (1953 AS AMENDED).

As plaintiff's brief, at Point I, explains, the issue
in this case depends upon application of Utah Code Ann. Section
35-1-42.

That statute defines the terms "employee" and "independent

contractor."

Employees are entitled to recover worker's compensation

benefits from their employers.

Independent contractors are not

entitled to worker's compensation benefits.

The relevant portion

of that statute follows:
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Where any employer procures any work to be done
wholly or in part for him by a contractor oyer
whose work he retains supervision or control. and
such work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, said contractor, and
all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors
under him, and all persons employed by any such
subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning
of this section, employees of such original employer.
(emphasis added)
This section clearly states that the contractor must
retain supervision and control over the work and the work must
be performed in the usual course of the -contractor's business.
Since defendant did not retain supervision or control over plaintiff's work, it is irrelevant whether the work performed by the
plaintiff was work that was a part or process in the trade or
business of defendant.

The Administrative Law Judge did not

need to address this issue since he clearly based his decision
on those facts in the record which demonstrated defendant did
not retain supervision or control over the plaintiff's work.
POINT III

DEFENDANT DID NOT RETAIN SUPERVISION OR CONTROL
OVER PLAINTIFF'S WORK WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH
CODE ANN. SECTION 35-1-42.
The evidence established before the Administrative
Law Judge mandated a finding that the defendant did not exercise
control over plaintiff's work. _The plaintiff worked on his own
time schedule, employed by his own techniques, used his own tools,
billed defendant monthly on completed houses, and, on occassion,
employed others to work for him.

Moreover, defendant did not

6
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deduct social security or withholding from plaintiff's checks
and he informed the plaintiff that he was not covered by worker's
compensation.
Plaintiff, in his brief, relies on various facts to
assert that defendant exercised control or, at least, retained
the right to control plaintiff's work.
control or the right to control.

These facts do not establish

For instance, the plaintiff

relies on the fact that the defendant could terminate the relationship
at will.

This is totally irrelevant to the issue of control.

Certainly plaintiff also could have terminated the relationship
at will.

Plaintiff relies on a few particular incidences when

he and defendant worked together on procedural problems, such
as timing, to argue that defendant exercised control.
facts

These

(plaintiff's brief p. 3-4) do not demonstrate any real

degree of control on defendant's part but merely suggest that
defendant and plaintiff worked together to complete the project
according to defendant's design.
Throughout his brief, plaintiff suggests that defendant
classified plaintiff as an independent contractor merely to avoid
liability and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to worker's compensation benefits.

In Harry L. Youna & Sons Inc .• v. Industrial

Commission, 538 P.2d 316

(Utah 1975), cited by plaintiff, this

court, relying partially on the employer's intent to avoid insurance
liability, held that the worker was an "employee" entitled to
worker's compensation benefits.

There is no evidence in this

case indicating that defendant intentionally structured his business
7
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to avoid insurance liability.

Moreover, the crucial factor in

Young was the high degree of control the employer exercised over

the worker.

This court, in Young. utilized a two prong test

to determine the status of the workers.

First, the employer's

major concern in the structuring of the work relationship must
be the avoidance of liability and, secondly, the employer must
exercise control over the work.

In Young the Commission found

not only an intent to avoid insurance liability but also a substantial
degree of control.

This court upheld the findings of the Commission,

stating:
This is one of the frequently encountered cases
which justifies the view taken by the Commission
that the employer wanted the 'best of two worlds,'
On the one hand, to have a person rendering a
service ayer whom he can maintain a high degree of
control; and at the same time to avoid the responsibility
that he would have to an employee. (emphasis added)
~.

at 317.

In the instant case, neither the requirement of control nor the
requirement of an intent to avoid liability has been met.

The

defendant did not maintain control or the right to control nor
Defendant's purpose in structuring his business in
the manner he does is not to avoid Worker's Compensation liability
to employees.

Plaintiff cites· from the record to support such

an allegation.

That citation, which follows, is incomplete:

A.

I have employees that are general maintenance
type people, that run errands and do miscellaneous
things.

Q.

And maybe a bookeeper, office people, or something
like this?

A.

Yes.
8
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Q.

But all the work in connection with your homes,
in construction itself is all contracted out?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Then what is the consideration?

A.

The consideration is that it is just a matter
of liability • • •

99%

(Plaintiff's brief at 6-7)
Defendant believes a more extensive citation will reveal that
the defendant's purpose was not to avoid liability for insurance
or taxes.
A.

I have employees that are general maintenance-type

people, that run errands and do miscellaneous
things.
Q.

And maybe a bookkeeper, office people, or something
like this?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But all of the work in connection with your homes,
your home construction itself, is all contracted
out?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And the purpose of this, if you will, Mr. Thorne?
Do you pay any insurance premiums, for anyone
that contracts work for you, to the State Insurance
Fund?

A.

Are you speaking of plumbers and electricians?

Oe

Any craftsman that work on any of your buildings?

A.

I would say no. I have employees that have workmen's
compensation paid for them, yes.

Q.

All righte
Now do you withhold taxes, or pay social security
taxes, on anyone who works in the construction
area on your homes?

A.

No,

I

99%.

don't.
9
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Q.

A.

Is it not one of the purposes, to avoid the expense
of insurance and taxes, that you build in this
fashion?
MR. FERRE:

I object to that your Honor.

THE COURT:

He may answer.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY:

I think he can answer it.

I would say not.

No. Definitely not.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY:

Q. It's not to avoid the expense

of it?
A.

It's not a consideration at all.

Q.

Then what is the consideration?

A.

The consideration is that it's just a matter of
liability. I don't what to have to worry about
keeping a crew of men busy all the time because
I'm busy for awhile, and they I have nothing for
them to do. Then I'm busy again, and then have
nothing for them to do. It is a lot easier to
find a subcontractor and pay him an exact· figure.
To know exactly what you have got in to a home,
and have them take all the responsibility to do
the home, and to have it done correct. I am not
an authority in roofing. I am not an authority
in tile work. It's better to get experts that
know this. And I would have a million employees
if I had to hire all those type of people.

This Court's holding in Young is inapplicable in the
instant case since defendant did not purposely structure his
business in such away as to avoid liability.

Defendant structures

his business as he does legitimate, business reasons.
Several facts which surfaced at the hearing indicate that plaintiff
was an independant contractor.

Plaintiff worked on his own time

schedule. Indeed, plaintiff worked on defendant's homes for only
three days in January.

Plaintiff employed his own techniques.
10
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Moreover, plaintiff hired his own workers on occassion.
Lodge y.

Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d 227

In Rustler

(Utah 1977), the

Supreme Court quoted with approval a prior holding, indicating
that the ability to hire one's own workers prevented classification
as "employee" for worker's compensation purposes:

An independent contractor can employ others to do
the work and accomplish the contemplated results
without the consent of the contractee, while an
employee could not substitute another in his place
without the consent of the employer.
,ld. at 228.
•

In Plewe Construction Company v. Industrial Commission,

242 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952), cited by plaintiff, the general contractor

exercised extensive control over the employees of the independent
The court in Plewe noted:
Marshall and Hunt shingled about 58% of the ro~f,
the Plewe Construction Company having obtained
others to do the rest of it. When Marshall and
Hunt reported for work, Mrs Plewe the president
of the construction company, told them he wanted
the shingles put on a quarter of an inch apart and
spaced 5 inches to the weather, that they were to
split the wide shingles and were to keep straight
lines by chalking across. Mr. Plewe or his brother
constantly supervised their work to see that those
instructions were followed, sometimes requiring
them to correct their work, particularly in regard
to putting shingles.
Mr. Plewe or his brother were at the job all the time
they were working, looking over the workmen's work
and directing them when they deemed it necessary,
and Marshall and Hunt acquiesed and complied with all
instructions •

.Id. at 562.
Clearly, in the instant case, no such control was
cised.

exer~

Defendant did not supervise plaintiff's work (R. 73,74).
11
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Indeed, defendant admitted that he did not know enough about
shingling to supervise the work. (R. 73)
Construction

Furthermore, Plewe

is distinguishable from the instant case because

the workers found to be employees in that case were employees
of the independent contractor, not independent contractors themselves.

There is a qualitative difference between determining

an independent contractor to be an employee and determining that
the independent contractor's employees are employees.

The independent.

contractor maintains substantial control over his work, his schedule,
his billing procedures, his techniques, etc.

The·employee of

one employer, working for another, does not retain such control.
Indeed in his findings of fact the Administrative Law Judge stated:
Even though the definition of employee is very
liberal under the law, and it may be so liberal
that an employee of the applicant might successfully
claim coverage under Thorne Construction, such
interpretation cannot be made as to the applicant
himself. It is very clear that the applicant went
to work for the defendant as an independent
contractor, carried out his work as an independent
contractor and fell and was injured acting as an
independent contractor. (Emphasis added)
(R. 100)
In Harry L. Young & Sons Inc. v. Industrial Commission,
538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975), also cited by plaintiff, this court
upheld the Commission's finding that the worker was an employee.
The general contractor, in that case, exercised a much greater
degree of control over the worker.

The court enumerated some

the of facts upon which it was determined that the general contractor
exercised sufficient control to declare the worker an employee:
Before defendant could take a load he had to
clear with plaintiff supervisor. He was not
12
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free to refuse to haul a load, or an oversized
load. He was obliged to check with the dispatcher
at points along the route as to his travel and
time of arrival. He was 'advised' the number of
miles the truck should operate each month which was
not advice but more in the nature of a direction.
The company set a speed limit of 5 miles per hour
less than the lawful posted speed limit, for
violation of which defendant was subject to
penalty; and was in fact penalized for an infraction •

.id. at 318-319.
In the instant case, no similar evidence has been established.

Indeed, most of the evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff

alone exercised control over his work.

Furthermore, Young is

distinguishable because, in that case, the Supreme Court merely
upheld the Commission's findings.

Here, plaintiff is asking

the court to reverse the Commission's findings.
Finally, plaintiff

ci~es

Bambrough v. Bethers, 552

P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976), in support of his argument that he was
an employee entitled to recover worker's compensation benefits.
In Bambrough, the court found an employee of one employer to
be an employee of a second employer for worker's compensation
purposes.

Bambrough. involved a fact situation very different

from the situation in the instant case.

In BaDJbrough, the plaintiff's

original employer entered into a "trip-lease agreement"

wit~

the defendant whereby the parties agreed that plaintiff, a truck
driver, would haul a load of wood, belonging to defendant, to
Denver, Colorado.

Before embarking on this trip, plaintiff called

his original employer concerning certain procedures and was
instructed, "If that's their procedure, you do it."

~.

at 1289.

The court relied heavily on this relinquishment of control by
13
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plaintiff's original employer to find that the plaintiff, injured
on the trip to Denver, was an employee of the defendant for worker's
compensation purposes.

Bambrough is clearly distinquishable.

In the instant case, no relinquishment of control is evidenced.
Furthermore, as in Plewe Construction Company, one must note
the difference between determining an independent contractor
(such as plaintiff herein) an employee and finding that an employee
of one employer (such as plaintiff in Bambrough) is an employee
of another employer for Worker's Compensation cases.

In Bambrough,

the employee retained no more control .over his work under the
supervision of the second employer than he did under the supervision
of his original employer.
CONCLUSION

The Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion
in upholding the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and,
therefore, this court should uphold that order.

The defendant

did not exercise sufficient control over the plaintiff's work
to declare the plaintiff an employee entitled to receive worker's
compensation benefits from the employer defendant or its insurance
carrier, the State Insurance Fund.

Therefore, defendant respectfully

requests this court to uphold the Order of the Industrial Commission.
DATED THIS

3Q~ay

of September, 1983.

BLACK & MOORE
('

~ ~.

BY Q)11Mf:\ J/5).

a:z,,4411"1

SUSAN B. DIANA
Attorney for Defendant
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